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Abstract
Scientists and Bayesian statisticians often study hypotheses that they know
to be false. This creates an interpretive problem because the Bayesian proba-
bility of a hypothesis is supposed to represent the probability that the hypoth-
esis is true. I investigate whether Bayesianism can accommodate the idea that
false hypotheses are sometimes approximately true or that some hypotheses
or models can be closer to the truth than others. I argue that the idea that
some hypotheses are approximately true in an absolute sense is hard to square
with Bayesianism, but that the notion that some hypotheses are comparatively
closer to the truth than others can be made compatible with Bayesianism, and
that this provides an adequate and potentially useful solution to the inter-
pretive problem. Finally, I compare my “verisimilitude” solution to the in-
terpretive problem with a “counterfactual” solution recently proposed by Jan
Sprenger.
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1 Introduction
According to the standard Bayesian interpretation of probability, the probability of
a hypothesis is the probability that the hypothesis is true. However, scientists, in-
cluding scientists who make use of Bayesian statistical methods, often investigate
models and hypotheses that they know to be false. In particular, statistical models
tend to be constructed on the basis of auxiliary assumptions (e.g. normality and
independence of measurement errors) that are often known to be false. Moreover,
statistical analysis is often restricted to hypothesis sets, such as the set of linear or
exponential functional relationships, that are known to at best be (false) approxima-
tions of the actual functional relationships. Presumably, if something is known to be
false, then it has a probability of 0 of being true, so all of the preceding practices are
hard to reconcile with the standard Bayesian interpretation of probability. Indeed,
Bayesian statistical practice apparently is faced with an interpretive problem: on
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the one hand, Bayesian probabilities are standardly interpreted as probabilities of
truth; on the other hand, Bayesian scientists routinely assign non-zero probabilities
to hypotheses they know to be false.
How serious is the interpretive problem and how may it be solved? I argue that
there are many cases where the interpretative problem does not arise, even when
the statistical model is false. But there are also many cases where the interpretive
problem does arise. Many scientific realists have suggested that successful scientific
models and hypotheses, though usually false, are nonetheless often approximately
true, or – at the very least – that successful hypotheses in general are “closer to the
truth” (or have higher “verisimilitude”) than hypotheses that are less successful. I
argue that, provided we jettison the standard Bayesian interpretation of the proba-
bility axioms, Bayesianism can accommodate the insight that some false hypotheses
are closer to the truth than others, and that this reinterpretation of the probability
axioms is potentially useful. I contrast this solution to the interpretive problem with
another recent proposal due to Jan Sprenger (2016), according to which probabilities
of false hypotheses are interpreted as “counterfactual degrees of belief,” and I argue
that the two approaches – when spelled out in detail – are formally inter-translatable
and help illuminate each other.
2 The Basics of Standard Bayesian Inference
Bayesianism is a prominent approach in both confirmation theory and in statistical
inference. Bayesian confirmation theory and Bayesian statistics clearly have many
things in common, but they are also di↵erent enough that it pays to discuss them
separately. In this paper, I will focus my attention on Bayesian statistical inference,
though much of what I will say also has relevance to Bayesian confirmation theory.
In statistical inference, a set of competing hypotheses is usually indexed by a
parameter, which in general will be a real-valued variable or a vector of real-valued
variables. Given a space of candidate hypotheses parameterized by ⇥, and given
some particular context in which the possible observations or outcomes are x1, x2,
etc. – or X, for short – a statistical model consists of a set of conditional probability
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(density) distributions, p(x|✓), that jointly specify the probability of each possible
x 2 X given each possible ✓ 2 ⇥.1
Almost invariably, the statistical model is premised on various auxiliary assump-
tions, A, that jointly guarantee that each value of ✓ entails a probability for each
x. Sometimes A itself has free parameters – so-called “nuisance parameters,” N –
that must also be estimated from the data, in which case the conditional probability
distributions will be of the form p(x|✓&n). Thus, a statistical model may in general
be regarded as being composed of two distinct ingredients: the hypotheses of inter-
est, parameterized by ⇥; and the auxiliary assumptions, A, consisting of nuisance
parameters, N , and background assumptions, B. It follows that a statistical model
is “true” if and only if the following conjunction is true: (1) some element of ⇥ is
true and (2) A is true: that is, B is true and some element of N is true.
For example, suppose you are interested in estimating the mass of some object by
measuring it a single time using a scale. The hypotheses of interest are the various
possible masses of the object, which you may index using a real-valued parameter,
m. The possible outcomes, x, are the various possible outcomes of the measurement.
In order to probabilistically link m to x, you may, for example, add the auxiliary
assumption, A, that the measurement outcome is normally distributed around the
true mass with a variance of d. Here d is a nuisance parameter. Then the assumptions
of the statistical model generate the following conditional probabilities:
p(x|m&d) = 1
d
p
2⇡
e 
(x m)2
2d2 (2.1)
In this case, the statistical model is true if and only if (1) there is some value m0
of m that corresponds to the actual mass of the object, and (2) the measurement
outcome is actually normally distributed around m0 with some variance d0.
What distinguishes Bayesian inference from other sorts of statistical inference is
that Bayesians use probability distributions to assess the plausibility of parameter
values. In addition to requiring a statistical model, a Bayesian analysis therefore
1Note: p is a probability function over the set X if and only if the following three axioms are
satisfied: (1) p(X) = 1. (2) p(xi)   0 for all xi 2 X. (3) p(
W
xi) =
P
p(xi), whenever the xi in the
disjunction are mutually exclusive.
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requires that the parameters of interest ⇥ and the nuisance parameters N all be
assigned so-called prior probabilities; these are probabilities that are assigned before
the observation of data. Moreover, if there are multiple candidate statistical models,
then all of the models must be assigned prior probabilities as well. In the above
example, prior probabilities must therefore be assigned to each possible value of
m and to each possible value of d. Once these probabilities have been assigned,
the joint distribution of the possible observations and the parameters is defined as
the product of the likelihood and the prior: p(x,m, d) = p(x|m, d) ⇤ p(m, d). The
posterior probability distribution of m is given by Bayes’s theorem, p(m|x, d) =
p(x|m, d) ⇤ p(m, d)/p(x, d)
There is disagreement among Bayesians concerning how prior and posterior prob-
abilities should be interpreted. Some see these probabilities as the subjective or ra-
tional degrees of belief of some agent, whereas others interpret them as evidential
degrees of support or as representing an objective state of information. However,
regardless of whichever more specific interpretation they endorse, Bayesians of all
kinds agree that p(✓) represents the probability that ✓ is true.2 This interpretation
of probability – the standard Bayesian interpretation – leads to problems, however,
because the models and hypotheses that scientists investigate are often believed or
even known not to be true. This problem has not gone completely unnoticed in
the philosophical literature,3 but in general the seriousness of the problem seems
not to have been appreciated. The problem seems to be more acknowledged in the
statistical literature, but no satisfactory resolution has been o↵ered.
3 The Interpretive Problem in Bayesian Statisti-
cal Inference
Statistical models, much like other models in science, contain idealizations and ap-
proximations that render the models strictly speaking false. Typical examples in-
2Or more precisely, the probability that the hypothesis indexed by ✓ is true.
3E.g. Forster and Sober (1994), Sha↵er (2001), and more recently Sprenger (2016).
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clude, e.g., the assumption that measurement error is bell-shaped, or that measure-
ments are independent and identically distributed. To be sure, these assumptions
are often justified because they hold approximately, but they rarely hold exactly. In
other words, the auxiliary assumptions of statistical models are generally false.
For these reasons, the statistician George Box famously said that “all models
are false, but some models are useful.”4 More recently, Andrew Gelman and Cosma
Shalizi write, “To reiterate, it is hard to claim that the prior distributions used in
applied work represent statisticians’ states of knowledge and belief before examining
their data, if only because most statisticians do not believe their models are true, so
their prior degree of belief in all of ⇥ is not 1 but 0.” (Gelman and Shalizi, 2013, p.
19).
A fully Bayesian analysis requires that we assign probabilities to our models
and to the parameters inside the models. But according to the standard Bayesian
interpretation of probability, the probabilities we assign are supposed to represent
the probabilities that the models and parameters are true. If we know that they are
all false, it would seem they should therefore be assigned a probability of 0.
Of course, Bayesian statisticians typically do not assign probabilities of 0 to
parameters or to models; they assign non-zero probabilities. This practice is what
leads to the interpretive problem, which may be phrased in the form of a question:
what does it mean to assign a model or hypothesis that is known to be false a
non-zero probability? To more precisely diagnose the problem, it helps to state the
probability axioms with the standard Bayesian interpretation made explicit:
Suppose H is a set of hypotheses {H1, H2, . . . , Hn}. Then
1S. p(H) = 1. Interpretation: one of the hypotheses in H is true.
2S. p(Hi)   0 for all Hi 2H. Interpretation: no hypothesis has a negative
probability of being true.
3S. p(
W
Hi) =
P
p(Hi), whenever it is impossible for more than one Hi
in the disjunction
W
Hi to be true.
4This quote is famous enough that it has a Wikipedia page. Box repeated the quote, or variations
of it, in several places. e.g. Box (1980)
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Here we can see that the interpretive problem is really a problem with the stan-
dard interpretation of the first probability axiom. That is, for many of the hypothesis
sets that scientists study, it will not be the case that one of the hypotheses is true.
Hence, strictly speaking, many hypothesis sets will not satisfy axiom 1S. Axioms 2S
and 3S, on the other hand, will generally be satisfied by the kinds of hypothesis sets
that Bayesian statisticians study.
One possible remedy to the interpretive problem that might initially seem attrac-
tice is to try to change the algebra over which the probability function p ranges.5
Later, we shall consider a couple of specific proposals along these lines. However,
there is a fundamental reason why any such proposal will not work. Briefly, the
reason is that if you want to do Bayesian inference on a statistical model that is
parameterized by ✓, then you need to assign probabilities to ✓; you cannot instead
assign probabilities to, e.g., propositions of the sort <✓ = 2 is the best parameter
value> or <✓ = 2 is the parameter value that is most predictively accurate>, be-
cause these propositions are not part of the statistical model. Nor can you amend
the statistical model so that it is instead parameterized by these other propositions.
Gelman and Shalizi’s (2013) solution to the interpretive problem (to the extent
that they see it as a problem) seems to be to refuse to interpret Bayesian probabilities
in any standard way. Bayesian probabilities of parameters inside models, they say,
are “regularization devices” and models themselves should not really be assigned
probabilities at all. This does not seem like a solution so much as an admission of
defeat. Morey et al. (2013) pursue a di↵erent strategy. They reply to Gelman and
Shalizi with the assertion that “...scientific models, including statistical models, are
neither true nor false” (p. 71) and that “Box’s (1979) famous dictum... ...could
be shortened to ‘some models are useful’ without any loss” (p. 71). They then
recommend assigning odds rather than probabilities to models because a “Bayesian
who employs odds is silent on whether or not she is in possession of the true model,
and, in fact, need not acknowledge the existence of a true model at all” (p. 71). It
is, however, unclear how using odds rather than probabilities is supposed to solve
5For example, some might be tempted to consider the algebra generated by the associated
propositions, <Hi is the best hypothesis>, for each Hi, or something similar.
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the interpretive problem. And it is not clear how refusing to assign truth values to
models solves the problem either. What does it mean to say that your odds are 5
to 1 in a model that is neither true nor false as against another model that is also
neither true nor false? The interpretive problem seems to be just as severe here as
before.
Moreover, the claim that statistical models do not have truth values seems wrong.
As we saw, a statistical model can be regarded as a conjunction of a claim about
the hypotheses of interest (namely that one of them is true) and a claim about the
auxiliary assumptions (namely that they are all true). It follows that a statistical
model is false either if none of the hypotheses of interest is true or if one of the
auxiliary assumptions is false. The second situation arguably is less serious than the
first.
4 False Auxiliary Assumptions vs False Hypothe-
ses of Interest
If a statistical model is false because one of its auxiliary assumptions is false – which
is almost always the case – then the interpretive problem arises on the level of model
inference. That is, if there are multiple statistical models that all contain known false
auxiliary assumptions, then all of the models will have a probability of 0 of being
true, and hence a standard Bayesian who wants to use Bayesian inference to find the
best model will run into the problem of how to sensibly assign non-zero probabilities
to the models.
How to make sense of model inference and model selection is therefore a serious
problem for Bayesians. However, if the statistical model is not itself the hypothesis
of interest, then the fact that the statistical model is false does not necessarily mean
we are faced with the interpretive problem.
Consider, for example, the previous example involving the estimation of the mass
m of some object. A good way of getting an estimate of m is by embedding m in
a statistical model. Now, even if the statistical model is false because it is based
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on known false (auxiliary) assumptions, probabilistic statements about m will still
be completely sensible; thus, in cases like this one, the interpretive problem does
not arise for inferences about the parameter m. For example, a statement like “the
probability that it’s true that m is 2kg is 0.5” is perfectly sensible as long as it is
remembered that the probability is premised on the auxiliary assumptions of the
model. If those assumptions are seriously wrong, the probability may well be inac-
curate or misleading; however, the probability can still sensibly be interpreted as a
probability of truth.
Because Bayesian parameter inference often makes sense even if the statistical
model is false, George Box famously recommended a reconciliation between Bayesian
and frequentism. According to Box, frequentist methods should be used to identify
a “useful” (albeit false) statistical model; Bayesian inference can then be used to
infer plausible parameter values inside the assumed statistical model. This two-step
procedure makes sense in cases where the hypotheses of interest are parameters that
represent real quantities out in the world, such as for example the mass of an object.
However, it happens not infrequently in science that the hypotheses of interest are
themselves known to be false, strictly speaking; but this has not stopped scientists
from employing Bayesian methods in their research. For example, phylogeneticists
in both biology and linguistics use trees to represent family relationships between
species or between languages. In both cases, the trees investigated omit known re-
lationships and introduce false idealizations. For example, a tree phylogeny for a
language family is premised on the (false) idea that languages bifurcate instanta-
neously and are forever separated thereafter. Yet, even though all phylogenetic trees
are clearly false, Bayesian phylogeneticists are often interested in discovering which
tree has the highest posterior probability. These probabilities cannot comfortably
be interpreted as probabilities that the trees are literally true, and thus we are faced
with the interpretive problem.
The interpretive problem also arises whenever the hypotheses under consideration
posit simple functional relationships that are almost certainly false idealizations.
This is usually the case whenever Bayesian linear regression is used, for example,
because most functional relationships in the world are not actually linear.
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As an example, suppose you are interested in the functional relationship between
just two variables, X and Y . For concreteness, suppose X represents some mea-
surement of a complex system, e.g. the barometric pressure of a weather system,
and Y represents some quantity of interest, e.g. how much it will rain in the next
hour. The true functional dependence of Y on X is in all likelihood very complex.6
Nonetheless, it is very common in such cases to restrict attention to classes of simple
functional relationships, such as the set of linear hypotheses with 0 intercept, which
models the relationship between Y and X as follows:
Y = ↵X + ✏ (4.1)
Here, ✏ represents the (hypothesized) random fluctuation around the linear func-
tion Y = ↵X; ✏ is generally taken to be a normal distribution with a mean of 0
and standard deviation d. ↵ is the parameter of interest while d is a nuisance pa-
rameter (auxiliary assumption); both need to be estimated from data. Note that ↵
does not represent some “real” quantity out there in the world; indeed, if we were
to interpret ↵ as representing a real quantity, then presumably that quantity would
be a rate. Thus, ↵ would refer to the constant rate at which Y changes (on average)
given changes in X. However, if the true functional relationship between X and Y
is not actually linear, then there is no constant rate at which Y changes in response
to changes in X. Thus, in sharp contrast to the previous example concerning the
estimation of the mass of an object, ↵ = 2 cannot be true or false in the same way
that statements such as m = 2 or m = 3 are true or false.
But if ↵ does not represent a quantity in the world, then what does it mean for a
given value of ↵ to be “true” or “false”? Well, ↵ indexes a set of hypotheses, namely
Y = ↵X + ✏, so to say that ↵0 is “true” in this case is the same as saying that there
exists some value of ✏ such that the hypothesis Y = ↵oX + ✏ is the true functional
relationship between X and Y . To paraphrase Sober (2015), ↵ “lives inside” its
6By “the true functional dependence,” I mean the functional dependence that would result if
we were to keep fixed all other predictively relevant variables and see how Y varies given changes
in X. Since X may – indeed probably does – interact with other variables, this definition is too
simplistic, but going into the details here is not worth the pay-o↵.
10
model; it has a meaning only in the context of the statistical model of which it is a
part. Not all parameters are created equal.
Note that in this example, it is pretty much a foregone conclusion that no hy-
pothesis of the form Y = ↵X+✏ describes the true functional relationship between Y
(i.e. how much it will rain) and X (the barometric pressure). Hence it’s not merely
the auxiliary assumptions of the model that are false in this case; the very hypotheses
that we are interested in are all known in advance to be false. Hence, the interpretive
problem hits us again with full force: how are we supposed to understand non-zero
probability assignments to values of ↵?
5 Approximate Truth
This is where the notion of approximate truth may be helpful. More generally,
scientific realists would doubt whether any scientific or statistical model could be
“useful” (to use Box’s term) were it not approximately true in some sense; thus, we
should assign a model (or a parameter inside a model) a probability proportional
to the extent to which we find it approximately true (in the relevant sense). The
question we need to ask is whether and how the idea that hypotheses and models
are sometimes approximately true or that some hypotheses are closer to the truth
than others can be accommodated within the Bayesian framework. Because model
inference and parameter inference are di↵erent in some important ways, I will from
now on focus only on parameter inference. That is, I will assume that the hypotheses
of interest are indexed by a parameter ⇥ inside some fixed statistical model, and
that each ✓ 2 ⇥ picks out some hypothesis that does not itself contain adjustable
parameters.
Before we can address properly the question whether some hypotheses can be ap-
proximately true or closer to the truth than others, we must make a few assumptions
about what approximate truth is and how it can be measured.
The study of approximate truth was initiated by Popper (1963) and has by now
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accumulated a large literature.7 The most influential contemporary approach in the
study of approximate truth – known in the literature as the “similarity approach” –
takes seriously the idea that approximate truth is a particular kind of approximation.
To say that something is a good approximation of something else is to say that the
two things are similar in some relevant respect. Thus, to say that a hypothesis or
is approximately true is to say that the hypothesis is su ciently similar to the true
hypothesis.
This idea can be formalized if we suppose that there is a (context-appropriate8)
verisimilitude measure, v, that takes as its input a hypothesis ✓ and has as its output
some real number that represents how similar ✓ is to the truth. If we presume
that such functions are available, we can say that ✓ is approximately true just in
case v(✓) < ✏, for some suitably chosen ✏. There are certain requirements that the
verisimilitude measure arguably ought to obey. For example, it arguably ought to be
non-negative, and it is also natural to demand that it be continuous whenever the
hypothesis space is indexed by a real-valued parameter.
As a concrete example, one non-negative and continuous divergence measure
that has been suggested as a verisimilitude measure in a statistical context is the
Kullback-Leibler divergence (Forster and Sober, 1994). Supposing that q is the “true”
probability distribution that governs the distribution of the data, then the verisimil-
itude (according to the K-L divergence) of some hypothesis ✓ (that does not contain
adjustable parameters) is KL(✓) =   R q(x) log q(x)p(x|✓)dx.
Unfortunately, the various ways one might try to accommodate approximate truth
within the Bayesian framework face a severe di culty having to do with the third
probability axiom. Briefly, the problem is that, given a set of hypotheses indexed
by a parameter, there will generally be multiple parameter values that meet any
verisimilitude threshold we set for “approximate truth.” Hence, the di↵erent param-
eter values will not be mutually incompatible in the sense that it will be possible for
several of them to be approximately true simultaneously. However, Bayesian infer-
7See Niiniluoto (1998) for a survey.
8In general I agree with Northcott (2013) that there is little reason to assume a priori that there
will be a single distance measure that appropriately measures approximate truth in all contexts.
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ence requires that the di↵erent parameter values be mutually incompatible. Thus,
Bayesian inference will in general be impossible if we change the goal of inference
from truth to approximate truth. For a more thorough discussion of these issues, and
how exactly a conflict with the third probability axiom is to blame, see the appendix.
The underlying problem is that approximate truth is too coarse-grained a concept
since it fails to distinguish between several hypotheses, all of which are approximately
true. This problem should motivate us to look for an alternative solution to the
interpretive problem.
6 The Verisimilitude Interpretation of Probability
Presumably some hypotheses that are approximately true are closer to the truth than
other ones, and – at least in many cases – one of the hypotheses under consideration
will be closer to the truth than all the others. This suggests a di↵erent interpretation
of probability. In particular, it is tempting to interpret p(✓) as the probability that ✓
is closest to the truth out of the hypotheses in ⇥; note that in contrast to both truth
and approximate truth, closeness to the truth is fundamentally a comparative notion.
I will call this interpretation the “verisimilitude interpretation” of probability, and
I will use pc with a c subscript whenever this is the intended interpretation. It is
helpful to write out all of the probability axioms with the new interpretation made
explicit:
1C. pc(⇥) = 1. Interpretation: one of the hypotheses in ⇥ is closest to
the truth.
2C. pc(✓)   0 for all ✓. Interpretation: no hypothesis has a negative
probability of being closest to the truth.
3C. pc(
W
✓i) =
P
pc(✓i), whenever it is impossible for more than one ✓i
to be closest to the truth.
There are several things to note here. First, and most importantly, just about
any set of hypotheses will satisfy the verisimilitude interpretation of the probability
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axioms. More precisely, given any set of hypotheses that can be compared using
some verisimilitude measure, at least one of the hypotheses must be maximally close
to the truth according to the verisimilitude measure, so the set of hypotheses will
satisfy 1C. Hence, the verisimilitude interpretation avoids the interpretive problem of
the standard interpretation, which we saw was really a problem with the first axiom.
The verisimilitude interpretation also avoids the problems with the third prob-
ability axiom that we identified with the approximate truth approach. In order for
Bayesian inference to be possible on the set of hypotheses, the hypotheses must be
mutually incompatible in the sense of 3C; that is, it must be impossible for more
than one of the hypotheses to be closest to the truth. This axiom will not always
be satisfied. For example, if the hypotheses are models and some of the models are
contained in others, it may be possible for several of the models to be equally close to
the truth, depending on the verisimilitude measure. However, most of the hypothesis
sets that Bayesian statisticians study will satisfy 3C.
Another important thing to note is that, under the verisimilitude interpretation,
the probability of a hypothesis is always relative to the set of competing hypotheses
under consideration. For example, in the set {H1, H2}, pc(H1) is the probability that
H1 is closer to the truth than H2. On the other hand, in the set {H1, H3}, pc(H1)
is the probability that H1 is closer to the truth than H3. The probability of H1 is,
of course, also relative to the verisimilitude measure. The verisimilitude probability
of a hypothesis is therefore not an absolute number; it is context-dependent and
contrastive. This is in sharp contrast to the standard Bayesian probability of a
hypothesis.
Finally, note that pc(✓) describes an epistemic attitude di↵erent from a degree of
belief in the truth of some proposition. Some might be tempted to interpret pc(✓) as
a standard probability that attaches to the proposition <✓ is closest to the truth>.
However, this is a mistake, for the reasons mentioned earlier. The proposition <✓
is closest to the truth> belongs to a di↵erent algebra than ✓ does. ✓ indexes a set
of hypotheses in a statistical model, but <✓ is closest to the truth> does not. If
Bayesian inference is to be used on the statistical model that is indexed by ✓, the
probabilities must be assigned to the parameter ✓, not to the associated propositions
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<✓ is closest to the truth>. Hence pc(✓) represents an epistemic attitude towards ✓,
namely the attitude that ✓ is closest to the truth out of the hypotheses in ⇥.
7 The Verisimilitude Interpretation of Probability
is Useful
The verisimilitude interpretation of probability is a logically viable solution to the
interpretive problem in the sense that it does not face immediate problems with any
of the probability axioms. However, some characteristics of the verisimilitude in-
terpretation may seem objectionable. In particular, the fact that the verisimilitude
interpretation makes probability assessments contrastive may be regarded as a seri-
ous drawback. Perhaps the appropriate response to the interpretive problem is not
to adopt the verisimilitude interpretation, but rather to not use Bayesian methods
whenever the hypotheses under consideration are all known to be false. On the other
hand, maybe there is an alternative solution to the interpretive problem that is bet-
ter than the verisimilitude interpretation. In this section and the next, I consider
both these alternative responses to the interpretive problem.
In order to determine whether the verisimilitude interpretation is defensible, it is
helpful to step back for a moment and ask a more fundamental question: why use
Bayesian methods at all? If the benefits of Bayesian methods remain even when he
standard interpretation of the probability axioms is replaced with the verisimilitude
interpretation, then the verisimilitude interpretation is not just logically viable, but
potentially useful. The goal of the next subsections is to give a preliminary argument
for the claim that the verisimilitude interpretation is useful.
7.1 Why be a Bayesian?
What is the benefit of using Bayesian rather than other statistical methods? Per-
haps the greatest selling point of Bayesianism is that the prior distribution gives
researchers a principled way of incorporating background information. For exam-
ple, suppose you are estimating the mass of a small cup of water, and suppose you
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model the outcome of your measurement as a likelihood function p(x|m), where x
is the outcome of your measurement and m is a possible value of the cup’s mass.
A standard classical (“frequentist”) method of estimating the mass of the cup is to
choose as your estimate the value of m that maximizes the probability of the ob-
served measurement. This estimation method is known as “maximum likelihood”
estimation.
From a Bayesian point of view, maximum likelihood estimation is essentially
equivalent to Bayesian inference with a flat (improper) prior probability function that
assigns a non-zero and equal probability density to every possible value of m from
 1 to +1, because the maximum likelihood estimate will be equal to the estimate
that has the highest posterior probability if and only if the prior is flat. Clearly,
the prior implicitly used in maximum likelihood estimation neglects to incorporate
common sense background information that we have about m, and is therefore –
from a Bayesian and intuitive point of view – deficient. For example, the mass of an
object cannot be a negative number, so no prior should assign any probability mass
to negative values of m. Furthermore, we can be absolutely certain that a small cup
of water is not going to weigh more than, say, 1kg, so we can also assign a probability
of 0 to all values of m greater than 1kg. Thus, as a minimal requirement, any prior
probability distribution we use should be restricted to the interval [0, 1]. Of course,
we have additional common sense knowledge that allows us to restrict the class of
sensible prior distributions further.
The above example shows how even very obvious background information can
be incorporated in a Bayesian prior in order to improve the inference. Indeed, at
least to Bayesian statisticians and scientists who make use of Bayesian methods, this
is probably the single biggest advantage that Bayesianism has over its competitors.
But how are you supposed to take into account your background information when
you are trying to come up with a prior probability distribution over a class of false
hypotheses? Do the advantages of Bayesianism carry over when the goal of inquiry
changes from finding the truth to finding the hypothesis that is closest to the truth?
In the next subsection, I will suggest that the answer is “yes.” Scientists often have
background knowledge that they can use to discriminate between false hypotheses
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in a principled way. And a good way of incorporating this background knowledge is
through the construction of a Bayesian prior.
7.2 Verisimilitude and Background Knowledge
Consider again the example concerning the relationship between barometric pres-
sure and the expected amount of rainfall. Suppose one of the things you know
about the relationship between barometric pressure and precipitation is that the
expected amount of precipitation is not very sensitive to changes in barometric pres-
sure. Throughout the whole possible range of barometric pressure, a small change
in barometric pressure will not lead to a drastic change in the amount of expected
precipitation.
So far, this is background knowledge about the actual, unknown function relat-
ing barometric pressure and precipitation. What consequences does this background
knowledge have for inferences about the hypothesis set actually under consideration?
Suppose, as before, that the hypothesis set you are considering is the set of linear
functions. That is, you model the relationship between precipitation and baromet-
ric pressure by the set of linear functions l(Y ) = ↵X + ✏, where ✏ is a normally
distributed error term. Can you use your background knowledge to discriminate
between the various false linear hypotheses in a principled way? Arguably, you can.
Intuitively, by any reasonable measure of verisimilitude, linear functions according
to which expected precipitation is not very sensitively dependent on barometric pres-
sure are going to be closer to the truth than are linear functions that model expected
precipitation as very sensitively dependent on barometric pressure.
How can all of this be captured reasonably in a prior probability distribution? Let
us first see how you can formally capture your background information. Suppose f is
the true (and unknown) functional relationship between precipitation and baromet-
ric pressure. Then the background information that precipitation does not depend
sensitively on changes in barometric pressure can be modeled as a claim about the
partial derivative of f (with respect to the barometric pressure variable). The sim-
plest and least sophisticated way of translating your background information into a
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quantitative restriction on f 0 is to to suppose that f 0 is bounded by some interval
(a, b). Next, the intuition that insensitive linear hypotheses are closer to the truth
than sensitive linear hypotheses can be formalized as follows: there is some suitably
large interval (a0, b0) that contains (a, b) such that every linear hypothesis l for which
l0 is bounded by (a0, b0) is closer to the truth than every linear hypothesis that does
not satisfy this requirement. Now, since l0 = ↵, the requirement that l0 be bounded
by (a0, b0) reduces to the simple requirement that every ↵ 2 (a0, b0) is closer to the
truth than every ↵ /2 (a0, b0). This, in turn, translates to a simple rational require-
ment on the prior distribution over ↵, namely that every ↵ /2 (a0, b0) be assigned a
prior probability of 0.
There are more refined ways of formalizing the background information that
expected precipitation does not depend very sensitively on barometric pressure. In
particular, if we assume a specific verisimilitude measure, then we can get tighter
constraints on ↵.9 Furthermore, if the hypotheses under consideration are more
complicated (i.e. contain more parameters), then the background information will
not lead to rational requirements on the prior distribution as neatly. My goal in
this section is not, however, to demonstrate in full generality how to best translate
background information into reasonable requirements on prior distributions over false
hypotheses. My goal is rather to show that it is possible to do so, and that it is
plausibly useful. I defer a more thorough treatment of these issues to another time.
9For example, suppose we use the following reasonable albeit crude distance measure as our
measure of verisimilitude: if f is the true function over the range (m,n) and l is a linear function,
then the verisimilitude of l is v(l) = Maxx2(m,n)|f(x)   l(x)|. In this case, if we assume that we
know that f is bounded by (a, b), then it is possible to prove that every linear function l whose
derivative is bounded by (a, b) is closer to the truth than every linear function whose derivative is
not bounded in this way, where closeness to the truth is measured using v. For the sake of space, I
omit the proof.
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8 The Counterfactual Interpretation of Probabil-
ity
The preceding section shows that the verisimilitude interpretation of the probabil-
ity axioms is a potentially useful solution to the interpretive problem. However, it
may be that there is another solution to the interpretative problem that is better.
Earlier, we examined two candidate solutions to the interpretive problem and found
them wanting. However, in a very recent paper, Jan Sprenger (2016) proposes a new
and di↵erent solution to the interpretive problem that is more promising. Sprenger’s
solution also involves reinterpreting the probability axioms, but he o↵ers a reinterpre-
tation that is interestingly di↵erent from the verisimilitude interpretation. However,
as we will soon see, given certain plausible assumptions, the verisimilitude solution
and Sprenger’s solution are formally inter-translatable.
Sprenger’s suggestion is that the probability of a false hypothesis can sensibly
be interpreted as a counter-factual degree of belief. More precisely, suppose ↵ is a
parameter that indexes a set of hypotheses, all of which are known to be false. Then
any probability assigned to some particular ↵0 should be construed as a degree of
belief in ↵0 that is conditional on the (false) supposition that one of the hypotheses
indexed by ↵ is true. In other words, the probability of ↵0 is really the conditional
probability p(↵0|_↵), where the condition _↵ is the false disjunction that says that
one of the ↵’s is true.
This idea is less abstract than it may seem at first blush. As an illustration,
suppose I have a coin in a locked cabinet. The probability that the coin would land
heads given that I were to toss the coin is 0.5, even if it is false that I ever toss
the coin. Similarly, according to Sprenger, we can evaluate the probability that a
hypothesis is true given that the false supposition that the world were such that one
of the hypotheses under consideration is true.
According to Sprenger, the counterfactual interpretation of probability o↵ers
a simple solution to the interpretive problem that avoids the “muddy waters of
verisimilitude.” However, in order to actually evaluate counterfactual probabilities
in a principled manner, it seems we have to enter waters that are at least as muddy
19
as the verisimilitude waters. Consider again the example concerning the set of linear
hypotheses relating X (barometric pressure) to Y (precipitation in the next hour).
We have already agreed that your actual degrees of belief in all of these linear hy-
potheses is 0. Your degree of belief (or probability density, rather) in some particular
linear hypothesis conditional on the disjunction of all the linear hypotheses may still
be di↵erent from 0, but how are you supposed to figure out what it is? You some-
how have to figure out what your probabilities would be on the assumption that the
world were such that barometric pressure and precipitation were perfectly linearly
related. In order for the counterfactual interpretation of probability to be a viable
alternative, guidance on how to evaluate counterfactual probabilities is necessary, in
the same way that some assumptions about verisimilitude are necessary in order for
the verisimilitude interpretation to be viable.
The standard way of evaluating ordinary counterfactuals is by appealing to possi-
ble worlds. According to (a simplified version of) Lewis’s analysis of counterfactuals
(Lewis, 1973), in order to evaluate a counterfactual such as ”If A were the case, then
B would be the case,” you have to go to the closest possible world in which A is true,
and then see whether B is true in that world. Crucially, Lewis’s analysis depends on
a ranking of worlds, where worlds are ranked by how similar they are to the actual
world.
Presumably counterfactual probabilities should be assessed in a similar manner.
It is not hard to imagine very strange and fanciful possible worlds in which barometric
pressure and precipitation are linearly related, but presumably most of those possible
worlds are not interesting or relevant. As is the case in counterfactual analysis of
conditionals, it is presumably the closest possible worlds that are the interesting
ones. But which possible worlds are those? To answer this question, you need to be
able to rank worlds in terms of their closeness or similarity to the actual world. But
a ranking of possible worlds is hardly easier to come up with than a verisimilitude
ranking of hypotheses.
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8.1 Relationship Between the Verisimilitude and Counter-
factual Solutions
Indeed, in general, any similarity ranking on possible worlds straightforwardly in-
duces a natural verisimilitude ranking on hypotheses, and vice versa.10 More pre-
cisely, suppose we are given a similarity ranking on worlds w↵   w1   w2   . . .,
where w↵ is the actual world. Then we can define a verisimilitude ranking on hy-
potheses as follows: suppose w is the closest world in which H is true and w0 is the
closest world in which H 0 is true, then v(H)   v(H 0) if and only if w   w0.11
Conversely, any verisimilitude ranking induces an ordering of possible worlds.
Suppose v(H0) > v(H1) > v(H2) > . . . is a verisimilitude ranking of hypotheses,
and for any hypothesis p, let Sp denote the set of worlds in which p is true. Then
we can define an ordering of possible worlds in the following way: suppose H is the
hypothesis with the highest verisimilitude such that that w 2 SH and suppose H 0 is
the hypothesis with the highest verisimilitude such that w0 2 S 0H , then w   w0 if and
only if v(H)   v(H)0.
Thus, although they appear very di↵erent, the verisimilitude interpretation and
the counterfactual interpretation of probability are formally inter-translatable.
Although the two approaches are formally inter-translatable, they provide di↵er-
ent perspectives and help illuminate each other. In particular, it is arguably easier
to come up with a verisimilitude measure than a ranking over possible worlds; for
example, the Kullback-Leibler measure is a well known verisimilitude measure over
statistical models, and this verisimilitude measure will induce a partial ranking over
possible worlds. Thus, the verisimilitude approach helps explain where rankings over
possible worlds are supposed to come from.
On the other hand, the counterfactual approach helps explain several features
of the verisimilitude interpretation as well. For example, earlier we saw that the
10For simplicity, the following informal demonstration presupposes the so-called “Uniqueness
Assumption” according to which, for every A, there is a unique closest possible world in which A
is true. This is a strong and implausible assumption. However, the demonstration does not depend
on this assumption.
11Hilpinen (1976) uses a similar approach to define a specific verisimilitude measure.
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verisimilitude probability of a hypothesis H is relative to the set of hypotheses un-
der consideration. If H is considered as part of the set {H,H 0}, the verisimilitude
probability of H is the probability that H is closer to the truth than is H 0. But if
H is considered as part of the set {H,H 00}, the verisimilitude probability of H is the
probability that H is closer to the truth than is H 0. The counterfactual interpreta-
tion clarifies what is going on here. In the first case, the counterfactual probability
that corresponds to pc(H) is p(H|H _ H 0); in the second case, the counterfactual
probability that corresponds to pc(H) is instead p(H|H _H 00). As can be seen, the
two counterfactual probabilities are conditional on di↵erent disjunctions, and it is
therefore not mysterious that the corresponding verisimilitude probabilities are also
di↵erent.
9 Summary and Future Research
I have argued that the interpretive problem is a serious problem, but that the prob-
lem does not necessarily arise just because the statistical model under consideration
is wrong; rather, the interpretive problem arises whenever the hypotheses of interest
are false. Next, focusing on parameter inference, I have argued that the verisimilitude
reinterpretation of the probability axioms provides a logically viable and potentially
useful solution to the interpretive problem. Finally, I have contrasted the verisimili-
tude reinterpretation with another reinterpretation due to Jan Sprenger, and I have
argued that the two reinterpretations are formally inter-translatable, but that they
nevertheless shed interestingly di↵erent lights on the interpretive problem and on
each other.
Several important questions remain unanswered, however. In particular, I have
not discussed the problem of Bayesian model inference or model selection when all
the models are all false. Nor have I discussed in any detail how researchers can come
up with principled prior probabilities that discriminate between false hypotheses.
Finally, I have not said anything about what consequences reinterpreting the prob-
ability axioms has for evidential principles like the Likelihood Principle or the Law
of Likelihood. All of this is work for the future.
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A Approximate Truth and Bayesianism
There are two natural ways of trying to accommodate approximate truth within
Bayesianism. The first way is to expand the algebra of propositions that p ranges
over, so that it also ranges over propositions such as <✓ is approximately true> – or
P✓ for short. Thus, even though strictly speaking we assign each ✓ a probability of
0 of being true, we can consistently assign its associated proposition P✓ a non-zero
probability, and moreover this probability represents the probability that P✓ is true
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and not just approximately true, since the approximation claim is in the proposition
itself. This way, the standard Bayesian interpretation of the probability axioms is
preserved.
The other natural way of attempting an accommodation is to abandon the stan-
dard Bayesian interpretation of the probability axioms, so that p(✓) is interpreted as
the probability that ✓ is approximately true rather than true. This line of reasoning
is pursued by Niiniluoto (1986) and Festa (1999). Let pa be a potential probability
function where the a subscript indicates that the intended interpretation of pa(✓)
is the probability that ✓ is approximately true rather than true. For concreteness,
we may imagine that pa represents the degrees of belief that some agent has in all
hypotheses (and models, theories, etc) that the agent takes to potentially be approx-
imately true. By contrast, p can be taken to represent the same agent’s degrees of
belief in propositions that the agent takes to potentially be true.12 pa is therefore
defined over a much more expansive set of hypotheses, models, theories, etc. than is
p. However, if we allow propositions such as <✓ is approximately true>, then pre-
sumably there will be a simple correspondence between pa and p in that we should
have pa(✓) = p(P✓).
There is some reason to prefer working with pa rather than with propositions
such as P✓. Bayes’s formula requires that we assign unconditional probabilities to
data x. If we stay inside the original distribution p, this means we have to calcu-
late p(x) =
P
p(x|P✓i)p(P✓i), but then we are faced with having to make sense of
p(x|P✓i), or in other words the probability of x conditional on the assumption that
✓i is approximately true. But this is hard to make sense of. In statistical practice,
each ✓i will, as was mentioned earlier, in general be part of a fully specified statistical
model, which means it will entail a probability for each of the possible outcomes. The
associated proposition, P✓i , however, does not entail any probabilities for data, and
it is hard to see how to come up with reasonable conditional probabilities of the form
p(x|P✓i). One might try to argue that it is reasonable to hold that p(x|P✓i) ⇡ p(x|✓),
and this will provide a rough value for p(x|P✓i), but not a precise one.
12Although I hasten to add that a subjective Bayesian perspective will not really play any signif-
icant role here.
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If, on the other hand, we move to the distribution pa, then we can expand the
probability of x as pa(x) =
P
pa(x|✓i)pa(✓i). Now, if we suppose that the statistical
model stays the same, then it is reasonable to suppose that pa(x|✓i) = p(x|✓i); i.e.
✓i still entails the same probability for x in the pa distribution as it does in the p
distribution. The final thing we need to do is to define the joint probability of ✓i and
x, which we can naturally define as follows: pa(✓i&x) = p(x|✓i)pa(✓i). Thus, we can
write pa(x) =
P
p(x|✓i)pa(✓i).
Introducing the pa distribution has problems of its own, however, since it’s not
immediately clear whether such a function can actually satisfy the probability ax-
ioms. For example, physicists use both the liquid drop model (L) and the shell model
(S) of the nucleus in order to generate predictions, even though these models are
logically inconsistent. Presumably, both L and S should be taken to be “approxi-
mately true” since they are both auxiliary assumptions used by scientists to generate
predictions; hence we should expect it to be the case (at least) that pa(L) > 0.5 and
pa(S) > 0.5. However, since L and S are logically inconsistent, the third axiom tells
us that pa(S _ L) = pa(S) + pa(L) > 0.5 + 0.5 = 1, which is impossible because (by
the first axiom) no probability can be greater than 1. Thus, there is apparently a
very foundational problem with trying to change our interpretation of probability so
that probabilities are interpreted as probabilities of approximate truth rather than
probabilities of truth.
However, on closer inspection, this objection fails. The third probability axiom
applies to sets of “logically incompatible” hypotheses; but what does it mean for a
set of hypotheses to be logically incompatible? On the standard interpretation, it
means that it is not possible for more than one of the hypotheses to be true; i.e. the
third axiom is interpreted as follows:
3S. P (✓i) =
P
P (✓i) whenever it is impossible for more than one ✓i to be
true.
However, in contexts where approximate truth rather than strict truth is the
target, this is arguably not how the axiom should be interpreted. Instead, the axiom
should be interpreted in the following way:
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3A. Pa(✓i) =
P
Pa(✓i) whenever it is impossible for more than one ✓i to
be approximately true.
On the new reading, the earlier objection loses its grip, for – as was pointed out
earlier – it is possible for both the shell model and the drop model to be approximately
true, so the condition for applying the formula in the third axiom is not met—the
two models are not logically incompatible in the sense of 3A.
Unfortunately, this feature also leads to a serious problem, because the hypothesis
spaces that scientists generally use will not be logically incompatible in the sense of
axiom 3A, precisely because it will in general be possible for multiple hypotheses
in the hypothesis space to be approximately true. But this is bad news, because
in order for Bayes’s formula to be applicable, the hypothesis space we use must
consist of logically incompatible hypotheses, since the denominator of Bayes’s formula
requires that pa(x) (or p(x)) be expanded in terms of hypotheses that are logically
incompatible. Consider, for concreteness, the class of one-variable linear hypotheses,
y = ax, indexed by the parameter a 2 R, and suppose we have available a continuous
verisimilitude measure v. Now suppose the true relationship between y and x is not
actually linear. Suppose moreover that we set the approximation threshold at ✏ > 0,
so that y = ax counts as approximately true if and only if 0 < v(a) < ✏, i.e. if
and only if v(a) is in the open interval S = (0, ✏). Then the set of hypotheses
that are approximately true is indexed by A = {a 2 R | v(a) 2 S}. Moreover,
v 1(S) = {a 2 R | v(a) 2 S} = A, which means A is also an open interval because
v is continuous. Since A is an open interval, it has either no members or infinitely
many. But this means either none or infinitely many of the hypotheses will be
approximately true. In neither case will Bayesian inference be possible. If none of
the hypotheses are approximately true, then clearly the goal of the inference cannot
be to find a hypothesis that is approximately true. If, on the other hand, infinitely
many of the hypotheses under consideration count as approximately true, then the
hypotheses cannot be used to calculate an unconditional probability for x. But from
this it follows that Bayes’s formula cannot be applied, and so Bayesian inference will
not be possible.
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The above problem arises whenever the verisimilitude measure v is continuous
and the hypotheses we are considering are parameterized by a real-valued parame-
ter. But many of the hypotheses spaces that applied statisticians make use of are
parameterized by continuous parameters; hence the problem arises very widely.
There are, as far as I can see, two ways we can try to get out of this problem.
As was mentioned earlier, there are two ways the unconditional probability of x
can be calculated, depending on whether we use pa or p with an expanded algebra
of propositions. In the pa distribution we have p(x) =
P
pa(x|✓i)pa(✓i). In the p
distribution, we instead have p(x) =
P
p(x|P✓i)p(P✓i), where P✓i is the proposition
<✓i is approximately true>.
If we expand the unconditional probability of x in the first way, we can try to
coarse-grain the hypothesis space; if we expand the unconditional probability of x in
the second way, we can try to create a partition out of the P✓i propositions. Neither
alternative is very promising.
Let us consider the second way out first. Carnap (1950) taught us how to create
a partition out of any set of propositions. The method is as follows: given any set
of propositions – A and B, let’s say – we form the state descriptions A&B, A&¬B,
¬A&B, ¬A&¬B. The resulting state descriptions then form a partition. Now, given
a set of hypotheses {✓i}, Carnap’s method can be used to make a partition out
of the set of associated propositions, <{✓i is approximately true}>; the resulting
state descriptions will then be logically incompatible (in the sense of 3S), and we
can therefore use Bayes’s formula on the resulting partition of state descriptions.
There are, however, two major problems with this proposed solution. First, note
that if there are n hypotheses in the hypotheses set, then the partition of state
descriptions will have 2n propositions. But that means that if the hypothesis space
is parameterized by a continuous parameter – so that its cardinality is @1 – the
partition of state descriptions will have cardinality 2@1 . But it is not possible to
assign a regular probability (density) distribution over a set with cardinality 2@1 .
The resulting probability distribution will have to make use of “hyperreal” numbers
(Wenmackers and Horsten, 2013), but there are significant di culties associated with
hyperreal probabilities—see, e.g., Easwaran (2014) and Pruss (2014).
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The other problem is perhaps even worse. In order to do use Bayes’s formula,
Bayesians who make use of the above proposed solution will have to somehow assign
likelihoods to each of the state descriptions, each of which is a heinous conjunction
of propositions of the form <{✓1 is approximately true}>&<{✓2 is approximately
true}>&¬<{✓3 is approximately true}>& . . .etc. It is very hard to see how reason-
able probabilities can be assigned conditional on such complicated expressions.
The other possible way out of the problem is to coarse-grain the hypothesis space.
If the hypothesis space is parameterized by a continuous parameter, then – as we have
seen – infinitely many hypotheses will in general count as approximately true if any
hypothesis counts as approximately true. However, if we make the hypothesis space
discrete by throwing out most of the hypotheses, then the remaining hypotheses may
well all be logically incompatible (in the sense of 3A). For example, if the parameter
that indexes the hypotheses ranges over the interval (0, 1), then we could coarse-grain
the parameter to (0.2, 0.4, 0.6, 0.8, 1.0), which may well range over hypotheses that
are logically incompatible. However, coarse-graining the hypothesis space in this way
is not very attractive because (1) how to coarse-grain the space would depend on
which ✏ threshold we use, (2) there are multiple ways to coarse-grain a hypothesis
space, and each way arbitrarily throws out most of the viable hypotheses. Needless
to say, no Bayesian statisticians actually coarse-grain the hypothesis spaces they
use in this way; nor, for that matter, do they create state descriptions in the way
suggested in the previous solution. Hence, accommodating approximate truth within
the Bayesian framework does not seem to be feasible when the hypothesis space is
indexed by a continuous parameter.
The above considerations do not show that all is lost for the approximate truth
interpretation of probability, however. In particular, if the hypothesis space is dis-
crete, then the above problems may not arise. On the other hand, the problems
will arise even with discrete hypotheses spaces, provided there are multiple hypothe-
ses that all meet the verisimilitude threshold that is set for approximate truth. So
to prevent these problems from arising, it is necessary to make sure that the hy-
potheses (or models) under consideration are su ciently distinct from each other so
that only (and precisely) one of them will count as approximately true. Otherwise,
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Bayesian methods will not be applicable because the hypotheses (or models) will not
be mutually exclusive in the requisite sense (i.e. in the sense of 3A).
But this is an awkward problem to have to deal with. And it points to a defect
with the concept of approximate truth: approximate truth is intrinsically too coarse-
grained a concept since it fails to distinguish between several hypotheses, all of which
are approximately true.
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